Abstract. We provide a conceptual analysis of several kinds of deadlines, represented in Temporal Modal Defeasible Logic. The paper presents a typology of deadlines, based on the following parameters: deontic operator, maintenance or achievement, presence or absence of sanctions, and persistence after the deadline. The deadline types are illustrated by a set of examples.
Introduction
Many normative rules in applications of artificial intelligence are concerned with deadlines. Bills must be paid before the end of the month; books need to be returned before a due date; products must be delivered within ten working days. In general we can say that a deadline combines a specification of a time point or condition δ , with the obligation to achieve some state of affairs ϕ before condition δ arrives.
Because deadlines combine time and obligations, they are naturally studied by a combination of temporal logic with deontic logic. Various papers use a combination of branching time temporal logic (CTL) with Standard Deontic Logic [5, 4, 3] . In such logics, the meaning of a deadline clause, i.e., that ϕ should occur before δ , can be expressed as an obligation which involves the 'until'-operator: OBL(ϕ Uδ ). This means that situations in which δ becomes true while ϕ has not been achieved, are considered to be a violation according to some normative system. However, such a characterisation of deadlines does not indicate what will happen after the deadline. Is it required to still complete ϕ even after the deadline, as for late payments? Or is it impossible or unnecessary to complete ϕ after the deadline, as for the late delivery of a wedding cake? Is an explicit sanction enforced after the deadline, or is the sanction simply that achieving one's goal has become impossible?
Since deadlines can have different functions, it is likely that several notions of deadline can be distinguished. In this paper we therefore want to provide a conceptual analysis of various kinds of deadlines, and to provide a formal characterisation. Such a characterisation should make it easier to have intelligent systems reason about systems of deadline clauses, to find out for example whether they are mutually consistent, or how a course of action can be planned that meets all deadline clauses; compare the motivation given by [5] .
To express the characterisation, we choose a Temporal Modal Defeasible Logic which combines the deontic modalities of obligation and permission with temporal intervals. Many normative rules allow for exceptions. Without defeasibility, it would be impossible to distinguish exceptions from violations. Moreover, a defeasible logic allows for a modular representation of deadline clauses, in which a clause may for example override earlier clauses, or override clauses issued by a lesser authority.
Usually, logic papers focus on the logical properties of a newly developed logic. In this paper, however, we would like to stress the conceptual issues of modelling temporal normative rules. It is necessary to understand deadlines, for example, for the implementation of procurement procedures, or for the management of automated service level agreements [10] . This research is part of a larger research effort to investigate the use of defeasible logic for reasoning with legal information [9, 8] .
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we define the Temporal Modal Defeasible Logic to be used in our characterisation. In Section 3 we provide a characterisation of different types of deadlines, and provide template formulas in the logic, to represent these types.
Temporal Modal Defeasible Logic
The logical framework of this paper is an interval based variant of Temporal Modal Defeasible Logic (TMDL), which is an extension of Defeasible Logic [2] to capture the deontic modalities obligation and permission and some aspects of time. Other variants of TMDL have proved useful in modelling normative reasoning [9, 8] and cognitive agents [7] .
We assume a linear discrete bounded set T of points of time termed 'instants' and over it the temporal order relation >⊆ T × T . We define intervals [t 1 ,t 2 ] as sets of instants between the instants t 1 and t 2 . Our framework is meant to incorporate temporal parameters into a non-monotonic model for deontic reasoning. It is not our intention to provide a general approach to temporal reasoning, nor an extensive analysis of operations and relations over time intervals, as e.g. [1] .
A TMDL theory consists of a linear discrete bounded set of instants, a set of facts or indisputable statements, a set of rules, and a superiority relation among rules specifying when a rule may override the conclusion of another rule. A strict rule is an expression of the form ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n → ψ such that whenever the premises are indisputable so is the conclusion. A defeasible rule is an expression of the form ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ⇒ ψ whose conclusion can be defeated by contrary evidence. An expression ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ; ψ is a defeater used to defeat some defeasible rules by producing evidence to the contrary. Definition 1 (Language). Let T be a linear discrete bounded ordered set of instants of time, in which the minimal unit is u and the lower and higher boundaries of T are denoted respectively by min and max. Let Prop be a set of propositional atoms, let Mod be a set of modal operators {OBL, PERM}, and let Lab be a set of labels of rules. The sets below are defined as the smallest sets closed under the following rules:
We shall use some abbreviations: A(r) denotes the set {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n } of antecedents of the rule r, and C(r) to denote the consequent ψ of the rule r. We also use Rule[ϕ] for those rules in Rule whose consequent is ϕ. If γ is a literal, ∼γ denotes the complementary literal: if q is the positive literal p then ∼q is ¬p; and if q is ¬p, then ∼q is p.
The resulting formalism permits to have expressions such as ψ:[0, 20] and OBLϕ: [1, 10] : the former says that ψ holds from 0 to 20, the latter that the obligation that ϕ applies from 1 to 10. Note that we allow for 'punctual intervals', i.e. intervals of the form [t,t]. As a notational convention, we simply write ϕ:t instead of ϕ:[t,t].
Definition 2 (TMDL Theory).
A TMDL theory is a structure D = (T , F, R, ) where T a linear discrete bounded totally ordered set of instants of time, F ⊆ TLit ∪ TModLit is a finite set of facts, R ⊆ Rule is a finite set of rules such that each rule has a unique label, ⊆ Sup is a set of acyclic superiority relations.
A conclusion of a theory D is a tagged literal ϕ having one of the following forms:
-+∆ ϕ and −∆ ϕ, meaning respectively that ϕ is, or is not definitely provable in D, -+∂ ϕ and −∂ ϕ, meaning respectively that ϕ is, or is not defeasibly provable in D.
Provability is based on the concept of a derivation (or proof) in D. A derivation is a finite sequence P = (P(1), . . . , P(n)) of tagged literals. Each tagged literal satisfies some proof conditions, which correspond to inference rules for the four kinds of conclusions we have mentioned above. Before moving to the conditions governing derivability of conclusions, we need to introduce some preliminary notions.
Definition 3 (Rule applicability). Let # ∈ {∆ , ∂ }. If rule r is #-applicable then ∀ϕ ∈ A(r), +#ϕ ∈ P(1..i). If r is #-discarded then ∃ϕ ∈ A(r) such that −#ϕ ∈ P(1..i).
Definition 4 (Modality relations).
For any ϕ ∈ ModLit, let the set convert(ϕ) be:
Definition 5 (Intervals: basic notions). Let 'start()' and 'end()' be the functions that return respectively the lower and upper bounds of an interval. For any
We provide below the proof conditions to determine whether a temporal (modal) literal γ:T is a definite conclusion of a theory D.
s.t. T T , r is ∆ -discarded, and
Defeasible provability deals with conflicts. This requires to state when two literals are in conflict with each other:
Definition 6 (Complementary modal literals). Let l ∈ Lit and X ∈ Mod. The set C (Xl) of complements of Xl is defined as follows:
As usual with defeasible logic, the derivation of a conclusion follows a three phase protocol. First we provide an argument in favour of the conclusion we want to prove. Second, we have to consider all possible counterarguments. Third, we have to rebut each of those counterarguments, i.e., find counterarguments against them.
In TMDL we must consider the times and intervals associated with the conclusion and the premises. So to prove a conclusion at time t we must find a rule of which the interval associated with the conclusion covers t. For counterarguments we look for rules producing the complement of the conclusion to be proved, and whose interval overlaps with the interval of the conclusion. The proof conditions are as follows.
w is ∂ -applicable, and w s, or (3) +∂ γ:T ∈ P(1..i) and +∂ γ:
w is ∂ -discarded, or w s, and
Let us explain the proof condition of +∂ γ:T , the defeasible provability of γ:T . There are two cases: (i) show that γ:T is already definitely provable (see (1)), or (ii) use the defeasible part of D. To prove γ:T defeasibly we must show that its complements β are not definitely provable (see (2) ). In clause (2.1), we show the provability of β :T such that β can be converted into γ (see Definition 4). In clause (2.2), we require that there is a strict or defeasible rule r ∈ R applicable, with γ:T as its head such that interval T includes T . Now we consider possible attacks: reasoning chains in support of a complement α of γ: any rule s ∈ R with a complement α:T as its head and over(T , T ). These attacking rules must be discarded (2.2.1.1), or must be counterattacked by a stronger rule w (2.2.1.2). Finally, in clause (3) we deal with the case where γ is defeasible provable on T and T , which form T . The proof conditions for −∂ γ:T , that γ:T is not defeasibly provable, are structured in a similar way. Positive derivations are replaced by negative ones and vice versa.
To illustrate the derivations, let us consider the following example: 6, 9] , so that does not overlap with the conclusion of r 1 , namely [10, 15] . The range of effectiveness of r 3 is [12, 20] which overlaps with the conclusion of r 1 , but it does not cover the intended conclusion (10) . So, we can discard this rule as well. Finally, the range of r 4 overlaps with the conclusion of r 1 , and covers the time for the conclusion we want to derive. However, in this case, we can rebut the argument since its premise is that e holds from 7 to 8, but we are given that e holds only at 7, so we cannot use this rule. Since there are no more arguments against OBLa:10 we can conclude it.
Analysing Deadlines
In this section we provide a number of parameters to analyse deadline situations. The hypothesis is that different types of deadlines can be characterised by instantiations of these parameters. Each parameter corresponds to one or more template rules. By making combinations of different template rules, we can generate every possible type of deadline clause.
(1) Customers must pay within 30 days, after receiving the invoice.
Example (1) can be represented as follows. The deadline refers to an obligation triggered by receipt of the invoice (rule inv init ). After that the customer is obliged to pay. The obligation terminates when it is complied with (rule inv term ). The termination is modelled by a defeater rule (;). Note that the obligation itself may even persist after the deadline. Generally, a deadline signals that a violation of the obligation has occurred (rule inv viol ). This may or may not trigger an explicit sanction (see below). This example can be turned into a general template for the representation of deadlines, where χ 1 , ..χ n are one or more contextual constraints, which trigger the existence of the obligation and fix time variables like t, ϕ is the condition to be achieved, and δ is the deadline condition. In the example above δ only specifies the 30 days period, but in general δ could be any action or event, such as 'having dinner', in 'I must finish work before dinner', when you do not exactly know when dinner will be. The violation fact viol(r) is a specific literal, indexed by the name of the group of rules. Persistence after the deadline. By definition, maintenance obligations do not persist after the deadline. But achievement obligations often do persist after the deadline, until they are achieved. However, this is not the case for all achievement obligations.
(3) A wedding cake must be delivered, before the wedding party.
In example (3), the obligation to deliver the cake does not persist after the deadline, since the wedding guests will have no use for it. In addition, the couple who ordered the cake, are entitled not to pay for the cake, or even claim damages after the deadline has passed without delivery. This can be seen as a kind of sanction. In general, the difference between persistent and non-persistent achievement obligations will depend on conventions about the underlying goal of the deadline. Nonpersistent obligations have a termination rule, similar to maintenance obligations. The rules for non-persistent deadlines can be generalised as follows 4 . r init non pers χ:t, δ :t δ ⇒ OBLϕ:[t,t δ ]
(initialise non-persistence)
Explicit or implicit Sanctions. Many normative rules are associated with an explicit sanction, such as payment of a fine. But this is not always the case. Often there is only an implicit sanction, of not being able to achieve the goal that underlies the deadline. For a sanction to be effective, it needs to be strongly disliked by the person sanctioned.
(4) Customers must pay within 30 days, after receiving the invoice. Otherwise, an additional fine must be paid. An explicit sanction is often implemented through a separate obligation, which is triggered by a detected violation. In this setting, legislators may need further deadlines to enforce the sanctions, leading to a 'cascade' of obligations. The obligation to pay a fine in (4) is an example of that. In other cases, like in example (5), the sanction is applied automatically. The wedding cake example (6) is a case of mutual obligations. A late delivery is a breach of contract. So the sanction is typically that the customer does not have to pay for the cake. An obligation to pay for the cake may be derived from another rule r or, alternatively, it is given as a fact. Clearly, in the former case we require that cake sanc r. Continuing the previous representations of example (1) , (2) and (3), we add the following rules to account for the sanctions in (4), (5) Because obligational sanctions are most common, rule inv sanc is generalised into a generic sanction rule, where σ is strongly disliked by the agent being sanctioned.
Notice that sanctions are not always needed. In example (7) we see a non-persistent deadline, with no explicit sanction, apart from the impossibility to achieve one's goals.
(7) Dinner guests must arrive before dinner.
Obligation or Permission? Deadlines are not only connected with obligations. In example (8) , there is a permission -or entitlement -which expires at the deadline.
(8) Within 30 days after delivery, customers may return a product to the seller.
Using the principle that an entitlement for one, is an obligation for the other to respect that entitlement, we could also say that after 30 days the seller is no longer obliged to take the product back. Permissions are similar to maintenance obligations, and can be modelled as follows:
The right to return a product is an example of an achievement permission. Example (9) , roughly the opposite of example (2), illustrates a maintenance permission: the right to remain in a certain state for a certain period.
(9) Customers may have a negative balance, for at most 30 consecutive days.
Here we assume to fix the time when the account gets a negative balance. Although one may observe that (positive) achievement permissions generally do not have violations or explicit sanctions, violations or sanctions can in fact be connected to maintenance permissions. After the permission ends, usually an original obligation will be restored. Remember that ¬PERM¬ϕ ≡ OBLϕ. So, depending on wether you want to model this as strong or weak permission [9] , a negative balance after the permission has run out, does constitute a violation. In some cases, this may also lead to an explicit sanction, as illustrated by (10) . (10 For achievement permissions or entitlements it generally does not make sense to have an explicit sanction. There is only the implicit sanction, namely that the agent is not able to achieve the underlying goals, made possible by the permission. This is a very common situation for permissions, but also for opportunities. In example (11) , there is no deontic operator at all. Here, it is the practical opportunity to travel, which expires.
(11) A traveller wants to travel to Rome. The last train to Rome departs at 22:05.
So whence the popular idea that you must return the product within 30 days, or that you must catch the train? Well, given the fact that you are not satisfied with the product and that you intend to return the product, or given the fact that you intend to travel, the only way to achieve these intentions is before the deadline. The necessity is not deontic, but is based on practical reasoning. We observe that many deadlines have this hybrid nature of deontic and practical reasoning. This completes our list of parameters. We can now construct different types of deadlines by varying the parameters discussed above. The result is shown in Table 1 Moreover, the deadline of a permission or a maintenance obligation, is the moment from which the permission or obligation no longer persist. So by definition, type 5 (again), 7, 9, 11, 13 and 15 are ruled out as well. The remaining 9 deadline types have been illustrated by examples. By a combination of the template rules for each of these types, we can therefore represent each possible deadline type in a uniform way.
In this paper we have given an analysis of deadlines, expressed in Temporal Modal Defeasible Logic. We have chosen a defeasible logic, because it can distinguish exceptions from violations, and because it allows us to have rules override the effect of other rules. This makes it relatively straightforward to model the initiation, termination and violation rules that generally specify a deadline. We have chosen to use intervals, because they provide a natural representation of deadlines, in particular of the distinction between achievement and maintenance obligations.
Although defeasible logic has been already extended to represent contracts [6] , this is the first attempt to integrate time. In artificial intelligence, Allen's [1] interval algebra is widely applied. Allen provides a model of the various ways in which temporal intervals may interact and overlap. Note, however, that the satisfiability problem in Allen's algebra is NP-complete [11] , which motivated the study of complexity in subalgebras. Although our logic is less expressive and does not cover Allen's algebra operations, its computational complexity is a matter of future research.
Previous work on deadlines typically uses a combination of deontic logic and branching time temporal logic [5, 4, 3] . However, existing work has typically not addressed what happens after the deadline. There are many kinds of deadlines, with different functions. In this paper we have presented a typology of deadlines, using the following parameters: distinction between achievement and maintenance obligations, persistence of the obligation after the deadline, presence of an explicit sanction and the type of operator, obligation or permission. By combining template rules for each of these parameters, we can give a formal characterisation of each of these deadline types. Currently, the typology is validated against a case study of a rental agreement.
